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The Green Paper
The Green Paper on the European Transparency Initiative (ETI) is long overdue and 
it is to be welcomed that the Commission has recognised and is beginning to address 
the serious issues of accountability and legitimacy that face the EU as a polity. The 
Green Paper rightly states that the framework in which lobby groups and civil soci-
ety groups operate is of great importance to EU governance and that “relations
between the Commission and interest representatives must be open to outside scru-
tiny” (Green Paper, 2006: 4). To enable this to happen the Commission must ensure 
all lobbying is transparent. 
The Commission correctly recognises that an essential component of its transparency
drive will be to ensure that “When lobby groups seek to contribute to EU policy 
development, it must be clear to the general public which input they provide to the 
European institutions. It must also be clear who they represent, what their mission 
is and how they are funded” (Green Paper, 2006, II.1.4: 5). This analysis is absolutely
correct in so far as it goes,
162
 yet the solution on offer, a voluntary register of lobby-
ists, cannot possibly do the essential work needed. Those proposing a voluntary 
register – in both the Commission and in the commercial lobbying sector – have yet 
to answer this critical point: what is to be done about those lobbyists who simply 
choose not to register? 
Based on principles of fairness and equality it is clear that all actors trying to infl uence
and shape public policy should be subject to some form of registration. The policy
process should be open and transparent, and nobody should be excepted from this.
Currently, the situation in Brussels is similar to that in the UK where regulation is 
focused on the activities of the lobbied. In Canada and the US the emphasis is very 
much on those doing the lobbying. Neither system is perfect. However, a system 
which combines information on both lobbyists and legislators (including offi cials) 
would best serve the principle of transparency.
161. Department of Geography and Sociology, University of Strathclyde.
162. It is important to remember that many commercial lobbyists provide background advice and analy-
sis for clients so all such work would need to be captured in order for the public to know who is shaping 
policy decisions, and how. It is also crucial that the Commission ensures such information is placed in 
the public domain in a timely manner.
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Why regulate?
The predominant response of the public affairs industry to the proposal to regulate 
lobbying is to appear perplexed. “Why,” they ask, “do we need regulation?”. They 
point to the lack of lobbying scandals and mutter about overkill. Most importantly 
they scurry about creating “professional” lobbying organisations and developing 
codes of conduct. These are intended to head off the threat of regulation by appear-
ing to be doing something.
The main problems with lobbying are secrecy, deception, imbalances in resources 
and preferential access for corporations.
Secrecy
Lobbying is by definition the representation of interests and not simply the offering 
or sharing of information and education. The fi rst and most essential thing for the 
public to know is which interests are being represented to EU policy makers, jour-
nalists and the public and by whom.
The problem is that the lobbyists still refuse to divulge their clients. The knee-jerk 
secrecy is an important problem in Brussels. A case in point is the European Public 
Affairs Consultancies’Association (EPACA), the organisation rather hurriedly set 
up by the biggest lobbying consultancies in Brussels to challenge regulation. Of 
course EPACA claims to be an organisation of long-standing informally, and maybe 
that is even true. But it has emerged into the light as a result of the perceived threat 
of regulation. EPACA is desperate to avoid any real transparency but at the same 
time to claim that it is all for it. In its press release responding to the publication of 
the ETI in May 2006 it stated: “The European Public Affairs Consultancies’Association
(EPACA) today welcomed the proposals aimed at maintaining the highest standards 
of lobbying in Brussels.” But a few lines later they let slip that they are actually not 
in favour of transparency. John Houston, Chairman of EPACA, said: 
“The EPACA code of conduct ... ensures that every time a lobbyist from one of our 
member consultancies has contact with the institutions the interest they represent is 
fully disclosed. That is what transparency is all about.”
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Unfortunately, this is not what transparency is all about. The question of transpar-
ency is one for the public at large not simply for lobbyists and their targets. Not only 
would the system they propose not be transparent, it would be unenforceable since 
it would be impossible to check each and every time if disclosure had been made. 
The only alternative is a mandatory public register disclosing clients for all to see.
Deceptive lobbying
But there is a need to disclose more than just clients. Corporations engaged in lob-
bying work and in funding think-tanks spend millions of euros on their campaigns 
163. “Public affairs consultancies welcome European Commission proposals”, EPACA, 3 May 2006 
(www.epaca.org/policy/documents/press_release_3may2006.pdf).
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to open up markets and pursue market opportunities. Most of the time we simply 
do not know if this has been ploughed into deceptive or dishonest campaigns. But 
we do have enough evidence that deceptive lobbying is a common problem. The 
huge number of policy and discussion groups set up by lobbyists to bring decision 
makers closer to corporate actors are an example of this. All of these should be 
required to fully disclose funding, and all of the lobbied (MEPs, civil servants, etc.) 
should disclose their membership of all such organisations. These fora are an impor-
tant source of corporate infl uence in Brussels. Lobbyists like to pretend that these 
have nothing to do with lobbying.
The funding of these lobby groups is paralleled by huge sums spent by the corpora-
tions on funding think-tanks and other lobby ventures. The little we do know suggests
a largely covert attempt to influence policy and practice. For example, ExxonMobil 
has spent US$120 000 on the Centre for the New Europe between 1998 and 2004. 
The funding is very rarely disclosed in the work of think-tanks like the Centre for 
the New Europe and the network of 130 other market friendly think-tanks clustered 
under the umbrella of the Stockholm Network.
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This kind of deceptive strategy is well known in the world of PR and lobbying as 
the “third party technique”. It is utilised by the corporations to deceive the public 
and policy makers about the support which pro-corporate measures actually have. 
Perhaps one of the worst examples of this in the past few years was the payments 
made by SmithKlineBeacham to patient interest groups to enable them to lobby and 
demonstrate in favour of the Patents on Life Directive. Simon Gentry, SKBs Head 
of External Affairs, admitted paying the Genetic Interest Group (GIG) “money and 
expenses” and giving them “gifts in kind”, offering help “to find their way around 
Brussels” and “access to our consultants”. An SKB company report claimed all this 
had “done democracy a good turn”.
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This use of “front groups” and covert funding of citizens groups is a key reason why 
all organisations lobbying the European institutions need to disclose how much they 
get from corporations or other lobby groups and what for.
Imbalance in resources
But the problems with lobbying are deeper than discussions of transparency can 
capture. Every observer acknowledges that the corporations have far and away the 
most resources to put into pursuing their objectives. During the life patents decision, 
SKB spent upwards of £20 million on its lobbying effort.
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This is a problem
which transparency alone cannot resolve. It is one reason why a reform of the
whole machinery of interaction between European institutions and lobbyists is
necessary.
164. Corporate Europe Observatory, “Covert industry funding fuels the expansion of radical right-wing 
EU think tanks” (www.corporateeurope.org/stockholmnetwork.html), July 2005.
165. Monbiot, G., Captive state: the corporate takeover of Britain, Macmillan, London, 2000, 259-60.
166. Balanya, B. et al, Europe Inc., 2000, 85. Monbiot, op. cit., 257.
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Corporate access
But perhaps the bigger problem in this regard is the preferential access granted by 
the Commission to the corporations and the lobbyists. The most obvious level is in 
the influence the corporations have over the Commission via lobby groups such as 
the Trans Atlantic Business Dialogue, the European Services Forum and the European
Round Table of Industrialists. Business lobbying resulted in the Single European 
Act, the creation of the euro (the Maastricht Treaty), the Lisbon Strategy (subordi-
nating Europe to a strategy of “competitiveness”), all of which followed corporate 
demands. But in its routine activities, the Commission privileges corporations in 
high-level groups. In the High-Level Group on Competitiveness, Energy and
Environment, the Greens revealed this year that UNICE, the employers federation, 
got six of the 28 invites alone, while NGOs had to be satisfied with one.
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But corporate access works in more than one direction. One indication is in the 
immense problem of revolving doors. Commission officials go on to take up lucra-
tive jobs in industry. At best this gives the appearance of conflict of interest. The 
Commission appears to be itself reluctant to acknowledge its own responsibility or 
indeed even the existence of such a state of affairs as the scandal of the Commission 
officials working on the REACH directive, who either came from or went on to work 
in the chemical industry as lobbyists, recently showed. The Commission originally 
denied Greenpeace claims, saying that they were “unfounded” and based on “sloppy 
research”. Greenpeace responded by naming the officials and citing Commission 
records to show that they had worked there.
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This example is one of very many in 
which officials in the Commission move into industry and vice versa.
In the end, we think that democracy cannot be reduced to interest groups. We are 
not in favour of a system which allows only resource rich groups to access policy 
makers, especially if there is no internal accountability in their organisations. This 
point is generally made by the corporate lobbyists attempting to trip up their resource 
poor opponents in the NGO world. But it is also clear that business organisations 
are not democratic in the sense that they do not reflect the public interest. All the 
internal democracy in the world cannot make a corporation a democratic body
reflecting the interests of the public. It is still by nature an organisation for pursuing 
private interests. Similarly NGOs are often not accountable to their members nor 
democratic internally. But even if they were this would not solve the problem of 
democracy, since the entire basis for the legitimacy of a democracy must rest with 
the people. 
At present, corporations are hugely privileged in EC decision making. But even if 
we reduced that privilege by opening up the system and allowing NGOs equal access,
the problem of legitimacy would remain. This is why the problem of the democratic 
deficit will continue to haunt even a transparent and open commission.
167. “High-level groups: corporate Europe is becoming a reality”, 10 February 2006 (www.groen.be/
homepage_page.asp?page_id=492).
168. Spongenberg, H., “Greenpeace accuses Commission of slander in chemicals law spat”, EU Observer, 
8 May 2006 (http://euobserver.com/9/21533).
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Transparency myths of the disclosure deniers 
But even the most modest arguments for transparency are rejected by the lobbyists. 
There are a few recurring myths that have grown up surrounding lobbyists regulation 
that need to be addressed. First, is the issue of definition. As experience in US and 
Canada shows, it is indeed possible to define a lobbyist, despite industry protesta-
tions to the contrary.
Secondly, the idea that regulation would generate a massive and costly bureaucracy 
that would not work needs to be properly assessed – again the North American 
experience tells us different. The range of electronic registration systems in place 
across the USA and Canada demonstrates that e-registration is a cost effective way 
of putting important information on lobbying in the public domain in a timely fash-
ion. The fact that many of the lobbying companies who have a presence across both 
the EU and US complain about the unworkability of such schemes in the EU yet 
appear to have little problem in complying with such legislation in North America 
suggests that such arguments are bogus.
Thirdly, the question of registration as a barrier to access crops up every time lob-
byists are faced with the possibility of regulation. Five years ago we surveyed over 
68 different organisations running lobbyist registers across the US and Canada.
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Not one of those who responded to this survey agreed with the idea that registration 
represents a barrier to the democratic participation of individuals and small groups 
with little or no resources. Many suggested that registration could often promote 
participation:
“I have talked to non-profit organisations who voiced a real concern that such disclosure
laws would have a chilling effect [on participation]. I have not seen any evidence to 
support that view” (Terry L. Draver, US General Accounting Offi ce, Washington).
The development of the dedicated Internet site and database to track the benefi ciar-
ies of EU funds demonstrates clearly that the creation of online databases is more a 
matter of political will rather than a question of bureaucracy or technology.
170
 If the 
Commission are prepared to use such technology to increase funding transparency 
then there is no reason why it cannot be done to increase lobbying transparency. 
However, the evidence suggests that this must be done on a mandatory basis. Research
in the United States by the independent watchdog Public Citizen clearly shows that 
voluntary electronic lobbyist registers have a very poor compliance rates, approxi-
mately only 10%,
171
 whereas mandatory registers have high compliance rates.
169. We undertook this survey as part of our evidence gathering for the inquiry by the Standards Committee
of the Scottish Parliament into the registration of lobbying. Miller, D., Dinan, W. and Schlesinger, P., 
“Response to the Standards Committee consultation paper statutory registration of commercial lobbyists”,
Stirling Media Research Institute, June 2001.
170. Green Paper, European Transparency Initiative, European Commission (http://europa.eu.int/comm/
commission_barroso/kallas/doc/com2006_0194_4_en.pdf), 3.
171. See for example Holman, C. and Lincoln, T., “Electronic reporting of lobbyist fi nancial activity 
under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995”, Public Citizen, 15 May 2005; and Holman, C. and Stern, 
R., “Access delayed is access denied: electronic reporting of campaign fi nance activity”, Public Integrity, 
winter 2000. 
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The current proposals set out in the ETI Green Paper offer very weak incentives for 
lobbyists to register on a voluntary basis, which means it is likely that many lobby-
ists will not sign up to such measures. In effect, all the effort and energy invested in 
the ETI will have been wasted. Instead of overemphasising and exaggerating the 
difficulties of mandatory registration some thought should be given to its real
democratic benefi ts:
“Regulation of lobbyists, to my knowledge, has worked everywhere it has been tried. 
There is always initial resistance to anything new, but lobbyists seem to appreciate 
some of the ‘ethical’ protections in regulations once they operate under them” (Marilyn 
Hughes, Executive Director, Oklahoma Ethics Commission).
According to our respondents, regulation has benefited the policy process: 
“Asking lobbyists to register and identify their clients, their expenditures, and their 
contributions at least gives the public, and the legislature, the opportunity to see who 
is doing what and potentially why. More than once I have heard a legislator say some-
thing like ‘I know X result would be good for your client, but is that a good result for 
the State of Minnesota?’” (Don Gemberling, Minnesota).
Many respondents added that the Web facilitates timely, user-friendly and inexpen-
sive registration opportunities:
“The [Wisconsin Lobbyists-on-Line] program especially benefits grass-roots organisa-
tions, small circulation newspapers, and smaller businesses that now have information 
that was previously only available to organisations that maintained a full-time presence 
in the capitol … This program is eminently replicable” (Judd Roth, Wisconsin Ethics 
Board).
“The public is benefited by these statistics [data from lobbyists register], but more 
importantly, by access – including electronic access – to the actual documents that are 
filed, with detailed breakdowns of the categories of expenditures of any given registrant”
(Pennsylvania State Ethics Commission).
In many senses the debate around transparency is one of political will. Quite simply 
if the Commission wants proper and meaningful democratic reforms it can make 
this happen. If the Commission is serious about rebuilding confidence it must make 
a register of lobbyists mandatory and it must require that clients and fees are dis-
closed. The Commission also needs to reform itself and stop preferential access for 
corporations. These are matters of great urgency and it is important that the Commission
demonstrates real political leadership. Civil society groups across Europe are look-
ing for some signal that the Commission is willing to respond to criticisms of the 
democratic deficits in European politics. A register that requires openness by all 
outside interests seeking to influence policy making would be an important way of 
addressing these concerns.
